I think there is a strong basis for distinguishing emotion and "feeling"
in Eliot's own prose. I spent months going through his references to it
for the essay on "The Poetics of Dissociation." This is an excerpt: for
the whole see Cassandra's and my book. But he seems consistent once this
is the focus i.e. emotion and sense experience as distinguished.

Yet in The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry, Eliot’s 1926 Clark
Lectures, it [dissociation] is far more complex, and it refers to an
ongoing “disintegration” from Dante to Laforgue. What disintegrates is
not limited to the immediacy of thought and emotion, and “sensibility”
refers not simply to the common meaning of emotional responsiveness.
Rather, it includes but goes beyond sensation itself–“sight, sound,
hearing, taste, and touch.” Eliot’s definition of “sensibility” in the
Clark Lectures begins with a reference to Sappho’s “Second Ode”: “You
will see that Sappho’s great ode, for instance, is a real advance, a
development, in human consciousness; it sets down, within its verse, the
unity of an experience which had previously only existed unconsciously;
in recording the physical concomitants of an emotion it modifies the

“Metaphysical periods” he claims, are those “moments of history when
human sensibility is momentarily enlarged in certain directions. . . .
[ii] This occurs when a type of poetry is written in which an “idea, or
what is only ordinarily apprehensible as an intellectual statement, is
translated in sensible form; so that the world of sense is actually
enlarged.”[iii] And “the characteristic of the type of poetry I am
trying to define is that it elevates sense for a moment to regions
ordinarily attainable only to abstract thought, or on the other hand
clothes the abstract, for a moment, with all the painful delight of
flesh.”[iv] Eliot finds this kind of poetry in three historical
“moments”: Dante, the seventeenth-century Metaphysicals, and the
French Symbolists, chiefly Laforgue and Corbiere. What these poets all
share is a fusion of thought and feeling or sense; what they do not
share is a system of thought that is an exact equivalent of feeling. For
Dante this existed; for Donne there were fragments of a system that he
was able to fuse with feeling. For Laforgue there was already a
disintegration of intellect that he could only address by “the
intellectualizing of the feeling and the emotionalizing of the idea.”[v]
In each case it is the fusion or integration of sense and idea or
thought and emotion that is “metaphysical.” 

[i]. Eliot, Varieties, 51.

[ii]. Eliot, Varieties, 53.

[iii]. Eliot, Varieties, 53-54.

[iv]. Eliot, Varieties, 55.

[v]. Eliot, Varieties, 213.

>>> Ken Armstrong 10/20/13 6:07 PM >>> 
His dissertation begins with a focus on what feeling is for Bradey (not 
feelings), both what it is and what it isn't. Emotions is one of the 
things it isn't. 

Ken A 

On 10/20/2013 5:51 PM, P wrote: 
> T&TIT is sensitive to the difference between the two words. 
> P. 
> "Rickard A. Parker" wrote: 
>> Thank you Tom for a terrific post. 
>> I had been confused about Eliot's usage of 
>> "emotions" and "feelings" in his essays. Maybe his 
>> audience was in tune with him from a standard 
>> usage at the time but I wasn't aware of a 
>> difference. I don't recall Eliot defining the 
>> terms either. I finally came up with something 
>> close to what you reported on with emotions being 
>> the ancient animal-like part and feelings being 
>> when the intellect got involved. As I remember 
>> though Eliot wasn't consistent with the usage and 
>> it appears to me that your author wasn't either. 
>> Thanks also for taking the time to do the scans. 
>> Regards, 
>> Rick Parker