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See Ellen Meiksins Wood, _Peasant Citizen & Slave: The Foundations of Athenian Democracy_. C > -----Original Message----- > From: T. S. Eliot Discussion forum. [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On > Behalf Of P > Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2013 1:23 AM > To: [log in to unmask] > Subject: Re: TWL as ground. > > And Aristotle? > P. > > Carrol Cox <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > > >As an antidote to Plato I would suggest Damasio, Descartes' [sic] Error. > > > >Plato's epistemology is grounded in his politics. Implicit in all the > >dialogues (and explicit in most) is the analogy between the person and the > >state, and this analogy depends on a radical separation of thought and > >action / brain (mind) and body. Deny this separation and the argument in > >this dialogue is empty. > > > >Carrol > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: T. S. Eliot Discussion forum. [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On > >> Behalf Of Tom Colket > >> Sent: Friday, August 23, 2013 2:30 PM > >> To: [log in to unmask] > >> Subject: FW: TWL as ground. > >> > >> > >> In case anyone is interseted, I found a 2008 post of mine in the TSE > >archives > >> in which I explored the topic of Phlebas in more depth. I'm re-posting it > >> below. > >> > >> > >> -- Tom -- > >> > >> ======================================= > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Subject: Re: Dans le Restaurant > >> > >> > >> From: Tom Colket [log in to unmask] > >> > >> > >> Reply-To: T. S. Eliot Discussion forum. > >> > >> > >> Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2008 11:43:49 -0400 > >> > >> > >> 10/9/08 > >> > >> In an essay on "Dans le Restaurant", William Arrowsmith asserts that the > >> name "Phlebas" is a reference to one of the dialogues of Plato, namely, > >> the "Philebus". It is interesting to note that the name "Philebus" means > >> "youth lover". > >> > >> I've read the dialogue, and it certainly contains lines that directly > >> relate to some of the themes of the poem that we have been discussing. > >> For example, the poetic reference to Phlebas as being 'handsome and > >> tall' seems to come almost verbatim from passage 48d and 48e cited later > >> in this email. > >> > >> Before I get into specific passages, I'll note that I'm using the > >> on-line translation from http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/. Search for > >> "Philebus" to bring up the lines cited in this email. > >> > >> The basic discussion in this Plato dialogue is between Philebus, who > >> argues that pleasure is the greatest good, and Socrates, who argues that > >> the greatest good is found in things like wisdom and knowledge and > >> memory. > >> > >> Here is a statement of the main issue of the dialogue: > >> > >> -------------------- > >> [11b] > >> Socrates > >> Very well: Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and > >> pleasure and gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a > >> good; whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought > >> and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings, > >> [11c] are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are > >> capable of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or > >> to come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of all > >> things. Those are pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they > >> not, Philebus? > >> > >> Philebus > >> Yes, Socrates, exactly. > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> I found it interesting that "memory" is a topic of the dialogue. In > >> "Dans", the waiter is haunted by a childhood memory that lasted for only > >> an "instant of power and delirium" but that he has remembered his entire > >> adult life. Also, Plebas, in death, is noted as "forgetting" the > >> adventure/money/sex that drove him during his lifetime. > >> > >> Here is a passage about memory from "Philebus", where Socrates points > >> out that the **memory** of pleasure is as important a component as the > >> original pleasure itself: > >> > >> ---------------------------- > >> [21c] Socrates > >> And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that > you > >> ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present > >> pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not > >> think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it, > >> and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to > >> calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be > >> that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the > >> oyster. > >> -------------------------------- > >> > >> > >> In this next passage, the point is made that 'desire' comes from a > >> person's soul, not from the needs of the body: > >> ------------------------------------- > >> [34e] > >> Socrates > >> We say of a thing on any particular occasion, "it's thirsty," do we not? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Of course. > >> > >> Socrates > >> And that means being empt[35a] Socrates > >> Of drink, or of being filled with drink? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Of being filled, I suppose. > >> > >> Socrates > >> The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what > >> he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> That is very plain. > >> > >> Socrates > >> Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first > >> can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of > >> fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt > >> before? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> It cannot be done. > >> > >> [35b] Socrates > >> And yet he who desires, desires something, we say. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Of course. > >> > >> Socrates > >> And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that > >> is emptiness, but he desires fulness. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Yes. > >> > >> Socrates > >> Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Yes, obviously. > >> > >> Socrates > >> But it cannot be the body, for that is empty. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> True. > >> > >> Socrates > >> The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, > >> [35c] which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could > it > >> employ? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> No other, I should say. > >> > >> Socrates > >> And do we understand the consequences of this argument? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> What are the consequences? > >> > >> Socrates > >> This argument declares that we have no bodily desire. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> How so? > >> > >> Socrates > >> Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always > >> towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Yes, certainly. > >> > >> Socrates > >> And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions > >> shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Certainly. > >> > >> [35d] Socrates > >> And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us > towards > >> the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and > >> the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul. > >> ---------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> In this section, the point is made that people fool themselves with > >> false ideas about money, their physical appearance, and their own > >> virtue. This passage seems highly likely to be the intended allusion of > >> Phlebas being 'handsome and tall'. In this passage, it is stated that > >> people falsely regard themselves to be more handsome or taller than they > >> really are: > >> > >> ----------------------------------------------- > >> [48d]. > >> Socrates > >> Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their > >> condition in one of three ways? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> How is that? > >> > >> Socrates > >> First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is > >> [48e] > >> richer than he is. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Certainly a good many are affected in that way. > >> > >> Socrates > >> And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than > >> they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than > >> is the case. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Certainly. > >> > >> [49a] Socrates > >> But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the > >> qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do > >> not. > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Yes, most decidedly. > >> -------------------------------------- > >> > >> > >> Finally, near the end of the dialogue, Socrates sums up the points made > >> about pleasure versus wisdom: > >> > >> > >> ----------------------------- > >> [60a] > >> Socrates > >> Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and > >> that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good > >> for all, and the two designations "good" and "pleasant" are properly and > >> essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one, > >> [60b] > >> but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from > >> one another in nature, and that wisdom's share in the good is greater > >> than pleasure's. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus? > >> > >> Protarchus > >> Yes, certainly. > >> ---------------------------------- > >> > >> I hope these passages stimulate some interesting discussions. > >> > >> -- Tom -- > >>