Illuminating, Ken, thanks.
I had the pleasure of being sent off to the library recently to look up some references to Bonamy Dobree and thought it might be worth sharing part of a letter from TSE that Dobree quotes in his essay on Eliot in Allen Tate's T S Eliot: The Man and His Work:
"I think there is some misprision on your Part about my Truth. I would not wish to make truth a function of the will. On the contrary, I mean that if there is no fixed truth there is no fixed object for the will to tend to. If truth is always changing then there is nothing to do but to sit down and watch the pictures. Any distinctions one makes are more or less arbitrary. I should say that it was at any rate essential for Religion that we should have the conception of an immutable object or Reality the knowledge of which shall be the final object of that will; and there can be no permanent reality if there is no permanent truth. I am of course quite ready to admit that human apprehension of truth varies changes and perhaps develops, but that is a property of human imperfection rather than of truth."
Can't help but think that "to sit down and watch the pictures" is a nice, if not allusion to, image of Plato's cave. At any rate it was probably pre-television. Eliot goes on to say:
"You cannot conceive of truth at all, the word has no meaning, except by conceiving of it as something permanent. And that is really assumed even by those who deny it. For you cannot even say it changes except in reference to something which does not change; the idea of change is impossible without the idea of permanence."
I think that for those given to this kind of understanding, the similarity in kind will be apparent to the relation of "absolute meaning" to meaning "not exhausted by any explanation." In truth, if one takes the time to work out the consequences, it is only an object of knowledge with absolute meaning that can have meaning not exhausted by any explanation. I realize that this could be taken by those who are not given to the kind of explanation of truth Eliot pronounces above as a sleight of hand. I'd only say that it's not, if taken on its own terms.