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I had the pleasure of being sent off to the library recently to look up 
some references to Bonamy Dobree and thought it might be worth sharing 
part of a letter from TSE that Dobree quotes in his essay on Eliot in 
Allen Tate's _T S Eliot: The Man and His Work_:

  "I think there is some misprision on your Part about my Truth. I would 
not wish to make truth a function of the will. On the contrary, I mean 
that if there is no fixed truth there is no fixed object for the will to 
tend to. If truth is always changing then there is nothing to do but to 
sit down and watch the pictures. Any distinctions one makes are more or 
less arbitrary. I should say that it was at any rate essential for 
Religion that we should have the conception of an immutable object or 
Reality the knowledge of which shall be the final object of that will; 
and there can be no permanent reality if there is no permanent truth. I 
am of course quite ready to admit that human apprehension of truth 
varies changes and perhaps develops, but that is a property of human 
imperfection rather than of truth."

Can't help but think that "to sit down and watch the pictures" is a 
nice, if not allusion to, image of Plato's cave. At any rate it was 
probably pre-television. Eliot goes on to say:

"You cannot conceive of truth at all, the word has no meaning, except by 
conceiving of it as something permanent. And that is really assumed even 
by those who deny it. For you cannot even say it changes except in 
reference to something which does not change; the idea of change is 
impossible without the idea of permanence."

  I think that for those given to this kind of understanding, the 
similarity in kind will be apparent to the relation of "absolute 
meaning" to meaning "not exhausted by any explanation."  In truth, if 
one takes the time to work out the consequences,  it is only an object 
of knowledge with absolute meaning that can have meaning not exhausted 
by any explanation. I realize that this could be taken by those who are 
not given to the kind of explanation of truth Eliot pronounces above as 
a sleight of hand. I'd only say that it's not, if taken on its own terms.

Ken A