And Aristotle?
P.

Carrol Cox <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

>As an antidote to Plato I would suggest Damasio, Descartes' [sic] Error. 
>
>Plato's epistemology is grounded in his politics. Implicit in all the
>dialogues (and explicit in most) is the analogy between the person and the
>state, and this analogy depends on a radical separation of thought and
>action / brain (mind) and body. Deny this separation and the argument in
>this dialogue is empty. 
>
>Carrol
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: T. S. Eliot Discussion forum. [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
>> Behalf Of Tom Colket
>> Sent: Friday, August 23, 2013 2:30 PM
>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> Subject: FW: TWL as ground.
>> 
>> 
>> In case anyone is interseted, I found a 2008 post of mine in the TSE
>archives
>> in which I explored the topic of Phlebas in more depth. I'm re-posting it
>> below.
>> 
>> 
>> -- Tom --
>> 
>> =======================================
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Subject: Re: Dans le Restaurant
>> 
>> 
>> From: Tom Colket [log in to unmask]
>> 
>> 
>> Reply-To: T. S. Eliot Discussion forum.
>> 
>> 
>> Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2008 11:43:49 -0400
>> 
>> 
>> 10/9/08
>> 
>> In an essay on "Dans le Restaurant", William Arrowsmith asserts that the
>> name "Phlebas" is a reference to one of the dialogues of Plato, namely,
>> the "Philebus". It is interesting to note that the name "Philebus" means
>> "youth lover".
>> 
>> I've read the dialogue, and it certainly contains lines that directly
>> relate to some of the themes of the poem that we have been discussing.
>> For example, the poetic reference to Phlebas as being 'handsome and
>> tall' seems to come almost verbatim from passage 48d and 48e cited later
>> in this email.
>> 
>> Before I get into specific passages, I'll note that I'm using the
>> on-line translation from http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/. Search for
>> "Philebus" to bring up the lines cited in this email.
>> 
>> The basic discussion in this Plato dialogue is between Philebus, who
>> argues that pleasure is the greatest good, and Socrates, who argues that
>> the greatest good is found in things like wisdom and knowledge and
>> memory.
>> 
>> Here is a statement of the main issue of the dialogue:
>> 
>> --------------------
>> [11b]
>> Socrates
>> Very well: Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and
>> pleasure and gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a
>> good; whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought
>> and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings,
>> [11c] are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are
>> capable of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or
>> to come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of all
>> things. Those are pretty nearly the two doctrines we maintain, are they
>> not, Philebus?
>> 
>> Philebus
>> Yes, Socrates, exactly.
>> ------------------------------
>> 
>> I found it interesting that "memory" is a topic of the dialogue. In
>> "Dans", the waiter is haunted by a childhood memory that lasted for only
>> an "instant of power and delirium" but that he has remembered his entire
>> adult life. Also, Plebas, in death, is noted as "forgetting" the
>> adventure/money/sex that drove him during his lifetime.
>> 
>> Here is a passage about memory from "Philebus", where Socrates points
>> out that the **memory** of pleasure is as important a component as the
>> original pleasure itself:
>> 
>> ----------------------------
>> [21c] Socrates
>> And likewise, if you had no memory you could not even remember that you
>> ever did enjoy pleasure, and no recollection whatever of present
>> pleasure could remain with you; if you had no true opinion you could not
>> think you were enjoying pleasure at the time when you were enjoying it,
>> and if you were without power of calculation you would not be able to
>> calculate that you would enjoy it in the future; your life would not be
>> that of a man, but of a mollusc or some other shell-fish like the
>> oyster.
>> --------------------------------
>> 
>> 
>> In this next passage, the point is made that 'desire' comes from a
>> person's soul, not from the needs of the body:
>> -------------------------------------
>> [34e]
>> Socrates
>> We say of a thing on any particular occasion, "it's thirsty," do we not?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Of course.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> And that means being empt[35a] Socrates
>> Of drink, or of being filled with drink?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Of being filled, I suppose.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what
>> he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> That is very plain.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first
>> can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of
>> fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt
>> before?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> It cannot be done.
>> 
>> [35b] Socrates
>> And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Of course.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that
>> is emptiness, but he desires fulness.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Yes.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Yes, obviously.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> True.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it,
>> [35c] which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it
>> employ?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> No other, I should say.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> And do we understand the consequences of this argument?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> What are the consequences?
>> 
>> Socrates
>> This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> How so?
>> 
>> Socrates
>> Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always
>> towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Yes, certainly.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions
>> shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Certainly.
>> 
>> [35d] Socrates
>> And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards
>> the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and
>> the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.
>> ----------------------------------------------------------
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In this section, the point is made that people fool themselves with
>> false ideas about money, their physical appearance, and their own
>> virtue. This passage seems highly likely to be the intended allusion of
>> Phlebas being 'handsome and tall'. In this passage, it is stated that
>> people falsely regard themselves to be more handsome or taller than they
>> really are:
>> 
>> -----------------------------------------------
>> [48d].
>> Socrates
>> Must not all those who do not know themselves be affected by their
>> condition in one of three ways?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> How is that?
>> 
>> Socrates
>> First in regard to wealth; such a man thinks he is
>> [48e]
>>  richer than he is.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Certainly a good many are affected in that way.
>> 
>> Socrates
>> And there are still more who think they are taller and handsomer than
>> they are and that they possess better physical qualities in general than
>> is the case.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Certainly.
>> 
>> [49a] Socrates
>> But by far the greatest number, I fancy, err in the third way, about the
>> qualities of, the soul, thinking that they excel in virtue when they do
>> not.
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Yes, most decidedly.
>> --------------------------------------
>> 
>> 
>> Finally, near the end of the dialogue, Socrates sums up the points made
>> about pleasure versus wisdom:
>> 
>> 
>> -----------------------------
>> [60a]
>> Socrates
>> Philebus says that pleasure is the true goal of every living being and
>> that all ought to aim at it, and that therefore this is also the good
>> for all, and the two designations "good" and "pleasant" are properly and
>> essentially one; Socrates, however, says that they are not one,
>> [60b]
>> but two in fact as in name, that the good and the pleasant differ from
>> one another in nature, and that wisdom's share in the good is greater
>> than pleasure's. Is not and was not that what was said, Protarchus?
>> 
>> Protarchus
>> Yes, certainly.
>> ----------------------------------
>> 
>>  I hope these passages stimulate some interesting discussions.
>> 
>> -- Tom --
>>