Tom

I am interested in your question:

"What does Bradley mean by 'feeling' in his dictum?  Is it something akin to
intuition?"

I would like to offer the following for consideration

I usually think of Intuition as instantaneous transcendental knowledge of
which the experiencer may conceive of as "received".

Feeling is a different sort of knowledge entirely.  Feeling is an awareness
of a knowledge which is largely and normally non-verbalized.   Verbalizing
feeling may describe it but does not necessarily replicate it.  Feeling may
result from an intuition but may not.  I may struggle for an hour with a
Calculus problem, suddenly intuit the answer and then be flooded with a
relief and pride at having "got it".  The intuition is not a feeling, it is
sudden knowledge.  The feeling is a result of the intuition.

Eliot was fascinated by the way metaphysical poets could somehow include
this non-verbalized  "feeling" with their poetry.  I think this is all bound
up with his ideas of an "objective correlative".  Somehow metaphysical poets
regularly used proper "objective correlatives" in their writings so that the
reader's emotion was engaged in a disciplined manner along with his
intellect.  One of the keys here is that it must be disciplined and
controlled to be effective.  Shakespeare, whom TSE didn't classify as a
metaphysical, lost control in "Hamlet" by not using proper "objective
correlatives"

I think this is what Bradley is talking of.  To understand the ultimate
problems requires more than simply an exercise of intellect; our emotions
must be engaged also.   In this Bradley is allowing emotional knowledge the
same credence as intellectual knowledge.  A significant allowance for a
rational philosopher.

Rick Seddon
McIntosh, NM