LISTSERV mailing list manager LISTSERV 16.0

Help for GERMAN-CFP-L Archives


GERMAN-CFP-L Archives

GERMAN-CFP-L Archives


GERMAN-CFP-L@PO.MISSOURI.EDU


View:

Message:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

By Topic:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

By Author:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

Font:

Proportional Font

LISTSERV Archives

LISTSERV Archives

GERMAN-CFP-L Home

GERMAN-CFP-L Home

GERMAN-CFP-L  March 2003

GERMAN-CFP-L March 2003

Subject:

CFP: Ethnic, Religious, or Cultural Plurality and Economic Institution Building (3/23/03; Helsinki Summer 2006)

From:

Stefani Engelstein <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

German Studies CFP Forum <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Mon, 3 Mar 2003 12:04:25 -0600

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (173 lines)

From Jürgen Nautz



Call for PaperS

Panel

"Ethnic, Religious .OR Cultural Plurality and Economic Institution Building"

14th World Congress of the International Economic  History Association to be
held in Helsinki, in Summer 2006

from:

Maria Eugenia Mata, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and

Juergen Nautz, Kassel University and University of Vienna

*

We are organizing a session for the, on the subject of

"Ethnic, Religious .OR Cultural Plurality and Economic Institution Building"

for the 14th World Congress of the International Economic History
Association to be held in Helsinki, in Summer 2006, additionally a
preconference (2nd half of 2004 or early 2005) and eventually a workshop are
planed.

.         There are no geographical or temporal restrictions (but 19th and
20th century preferred) for papers.

.         Theoretical and empirical papers are welcome.

.         Applicants should  focus on economic history.

.         Participants should be willing to publish their paper in our
anthology



.Deadline for paper submissions: March, 23, 2003 -

Please submit you proposals to

Univ.-Doz. Dr. Jürgen Nautz
Dep. of Law and Social Sciences, Kassel University
and:
Dep. of Economics, University of Vienna

[log in to unmask] or [log in to unmask]



The theoretical framework of this project:

Economic and social sets of human rights (such as political and civil
rights) have been defined primarily as individual rights. John Rawls for
instance deals with the problem of "how a society should determine what
constitutes a basic set of rights and thus constitutes justice: each of us
should go behind a metaphorical veil of ignorance where we determine what we
think our rights should be with no knowledge of what our actual economic
standing, educational level, gender, or ethnic origin would be." (Nikolas K.
Gvosdev) The individual and methodological individualism are basic
assumptions of Western economic theory (Neoclassical economic theory or New
Institutional Economics).

History and recent experience, however, provide numerous examples that show
that the individual is profoundly influenced by his or her group identity.
This applies to family relationships as well as religious, cultural or
ethnic senses of belonging. If we accept that individuals are defined by
their group membership we must attend to the effects on the structure and
functioning of economic institutions and organizations; and of course on
institutional change. In their analysis of the limits of institutional
competition in the development of the European Economic and Monetary Union
Daniel Kiwit and Stefan Voigt have reached the conclusion that external
institutions, such as property rights,  are supported by the population when
their substance is in harmony with the society's internal institutions. Only
then is the legitimacy and survival of external institutions guaranteed.

  History provides a wealth of illustrations. For instance if this argument
is applied to the ethnic interests within the Habsburg empire, considerable
supporting evidence can be found. Consider the successful Czech efforts to
develop their own banking system and industrial structure, and the Hungarian
industrialization policies.

Fiscal and monetary policies affect different segments of society
differently and have distributional and social consequences. For this
reason, interest groups try to influence the structure of the fiscal and
monetary order as well as economic and monetary policy. In the Habsburg
Monarchy this expressed itself in the competition between the political
representatives of the various nationalities for mobile resources. To the
extent that they possessed their own external institutions (laws, state
ordinances etc.), as in the case of the Germans and Hungarians they also
made use of them. Competition using external institutions was a
characteristic but not the only feature of the rivalry between the Austrian
and Hungarian lands. A second component, the only one available to the
national minorities in the two halves of the empire, was competition using
internal institutions (social mores, morality, language etc.: "Plįc¯ koruny
c¯eské"). This was done by criticizing real or imagined political, social and
economic discrimination as well as emphasizing values such as national
self-determination, protection of ethnic, cultural or linguistic identity
and cohesion etc. The ethnically oriented organizations pinned their hopes
on a new definition of the citizen that no longer emphasized the position of
the individual as a citizen, but his role as a member of an ethnic group: In
the Roman Empire Jews possessed the status of a religio licita, and as such
enjoyed specific rights as Jews such as the right not to work on the Jewish
Sabbath. Such rights were not granted to the individual Jew but to the
Jewish collective. This distinguished them for example from the Celts. The
millet system of the Ottoman Empire - a further example - defined each group
in the state via their religious community with the consequence that
inhabitants of the same town or village had different rights and duties,
dependent on their faith. Further examples of a tension between group
interests and central economic institutions are found in many other
societies. It is therefore meaningful and productive to deal with this
problem: "ethnic, religious, or cultural plurality and economic institution
building".

This project doesn't intend a discourse about the well-known associations
question: cartels, labor unions, and so on. Rather, we hope to examine the
neglected interaction between central economic institutions and social
plurality or fragmentation. When a society is deeply divided among different
ethnic groups, democratic politics that emphasize individual rights and
liberties may contradict ethnic collective demands.  Thus, scholars like
Arend Lijphard claim that it is not democracy but the "type" of democratic
institutions that matters in conflict management in ethnically or religious
plural societies.  These scholars consider political institutions a means of
ameliorating conflict in ethnically plural nations.  Therefore a democratic
political system may be problematic unless proper political institutions are
established for the accommodation of ethnic, cultural or religious
differences.  They suggest consensus and decentralized type of democratic
institutions as more feasible alternatives for these societies than
majoritarian and centralized democratic institutions.

  Democratic politics can be considered as a competition for the
representation of various interests in politics.  However, in multi-ethnic
states there might be a gap between the interests represented in the state
and the demands raised by the "people" because the society is divided along
linguistic, cultural, or religious lines.  For some groups democratic
governments may not be legitimate if the group lacks explicit representation
and influence over policies.  As important constituents of modern politics,
ethnic groups may aim at the promotion of their cultural, socioeconomic, and
political goals. In some cases ethnic groups mobilize against the state
through separatist movements claiming their own nation. For example, the
French in Canada and the Basques in Spain are two ethnic nationalities; one
relatively poor (Quebec) and the other relatively wealthy (Basque that seek
formal collective recognition.

The institutional perspective asserts that democracy may become problematic
in multi-ethnic societies if institutional arrangements are made without
taking ethnic divisions into consideration. Arend Lijphart coined the term
"consociationalism" to describe the sharing of power between segments of
society joined together by a common citizenship but divided by ethnicity,
language, religion, or other factors. Some rights are given, therefore, to
communities rather than to individuals, resulting in over- or
under-representation for individuals from some segments of society. (One
long-standing example is the creation of the United States Senate. Each
state gets two senators; geographic equality. Alaska, with 400,000 people,
has two senators, while California, with thirty million people, also has
two. Alaskans are over-represented in the Senate by a factor of
approximately 100 compared to Californians. This exists even though the
United States upholds in principle, the idea of one-personone-vote.) A
number of countries are openly and deliberately governed by the principles
of "consociationalism." These include Belgium, South Africa, Zimbabwe,
India, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Northern
Ireland (after Good Friday agreements of 1998).

In this project we want to discuss two fundamental questions. For every form
of national economic cooperation are the advantages of cooperation great
enough to compensate for the possible disadvantages? Are the incentives to
observe the agreements great enough to ensure the continuation of
cooperation?

Top of Message | Previous Page | Permalink

Advanced Options


Options

Log In

Log In

Get Password

Get Password


Search Archives

Search Archives


Subscribe or Unsubscribe

Subscribe or Unsubscribe


Archives

December 2020
November 2020
October 2020
September 2020
August 2020
July 2020
June 2020
May 2020
April 2020
March 2020
February 2020
January 2020
December 2019
November 2019
October 2019
September 2019
August 2019
July 2019
June 2019
May 2019
April 2019
March 2019
February 2019
January 2019
December 2018
November 2018
October 2018
September 2018
August 2018
July 2018
June 2018
May 2018
April 2018
March 2018
February 2018
January 2018
December 2017
November 2017
October 2017
September 2017
August 2017
July 2017
June 2017
May 2017
April 2017
March 2017
February 2017
January 2017
December 2016
November 2016
October 2016
September 2016
August 2016
July 2016
June 2016
May 2016
April 2016
March 2016
February 2016
January 2016
December 2015
November 2015
October 2015
September 2015
August 2015
July 2015
June 2015
May 2015
April 2015
March 2015
February 2015
January 2015
December 2014
November 2014
October 2014
September 2014
August 2014
July 2014
June 2014
May 2014
April 2014
March 2014
February 2014
January 2014
December 2013
November 2013
October 2013
September 2013
August 2013
July 2013
June 2013
May 2013
April 2013
March 2013
February 2013
January 2013
December 2012
November 2012
October 2012
September 2012
August 2012
July 2012
June 2012
May 2012
April 2012
March 2012
February 2012
January 2012
December 2011
November 2011
October 2011
September 2011
August 2011
July 2011
June 2011
May 2011
April 2011
March 2011
February 2011
January 2011
December 2010
November 2010
October 2010
September 2010
August 2010
July 2010
June 2010
May 2010
April 2010
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
December 2008
November 2008
October 2008
September 2008
August 2008
July 2008
June 2008
May 2008
April 2008
March 2008
February 2008
January 2008
December 2007
November 2007
October 2007
September 2007
August 2007
July 2007
June 2007
May 2007
April 2007
March 2007
February 2007
January 2007
December 2006
November 2006
October 2006
September 2006
August 2006
July 2006
June 2006
May 2006
April 2006
March 2006
February 2006
January 2006
December 2005
November 2005
October 2005
September 2005
August 2005
July 2005
June 2005
May 2005
April 2005
March 2005
February 2005
January 2005
December 2004
November 2004
October 2004
September 2004
August 2004
July 2004
June 2004
May 2004
April 2004
March 2004
February 2004
January 2004
December 2003
November 2003
October 2003
September 2003
August 2003
July 2003
June 2003
May 2003
April 2003
March 2003
February 2003
January 2003
December 2002
November 2002
October 2002
September 2002
August 2002
July 2002

ATOM RSS1 RSS2



PO.MISSOURI.EDU

Secured by F-Secure Anti-Virus CataList Email List Search Powered by the LISTSERV Email List Manager