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In a message dated 3/29/01 9:06:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, [log in to unmask]
writes:
> Richard Seddon wrote:
>
> > The ideogrammic method is "Language beyond Metaphor".
>
> Your example of how "red" might be represented by various red objects
> sounds to
> me like a metaphor. Expliquez, M. Rick.
>
> Mlle M.
>
If anyone is interested in Eliot on color, the excerpt below is from his
dissertation. I used it in an anthology of writings on color, because it's
great--a sensible statement in an area where so few people make sensible
statements. I think Eliot gets a lot of his visual approach to color from
Bertrand Russell (see especially Russell on color in physics in Of Human
Knowedge) and both of them reason about color in a pragmatic manner that
comes straight out of Aristotle (see esp. Aristotle on color in the
Metaphysics).
We've not talked at all about Eliot's powers of observation. I don't know if
other people will agree, but I think they're outstanding. Some of it may have
come to him naturally, though his training in philosophy almost certainly
helped.
Pat
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Red as a Sensation
[A] "red object" is an object which is otherwise known than by
the quality red; it is an object which has been given a
determined place in an order. The sensation is an object which
has not yet thus been placed. It is incorrect, then, to say that
we can have sensations of redness; redness is a concept; or to
say that we have sensations of red. The sensation is of a red
something, a red spot or area. And the discovery that the cause
of the sensation is a pathological irritation does not affect the
objectivity of the sensation in the least. The red "that" was
there, and the fact that the object can not be further defined
and verified does not make it any the less object (62).
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<HTML><FONT FACE=arial,helvetica><FONT SIZE=3 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial Narrow" LANG="0"><B>In a message dated 3/29/01 9:06:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, [log in to unmask]
<BR>writes:
<BR>
<BR></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0"></B>
<BR><BLOCKQUOTE TYPE=CITE style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 5px">Richard Seddon wrote:
<BR>
<BR>> The ideogrammic method is "Language beyond Metaphor".
<BR>
<BR>Your example of how "red" might be represented by various red objects
<BR>sounds to
<BR>me like a metaphor. Expliquez, M. Rick.
<BR>
<BR>Mlle M.
<BR></FONT><FONT COLOR="#0f0f0f" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0"></BLOCKQUOTE>
<BR></FONT></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial Narrow" LANG="0"><B>
<BR>If anyone is interested in Eliot on color, the excerpt below is from his
<BR>dissertation. I used it in an anthology of writings on color, because it's
<BR>great--a sensible statement in an area where so few people make sensible
<BR>statements. I think Eliot gets a lot of his visual approach to color from
<BR>Bertrand Russell (see especially Russell on color in physics in Of Human
<BR>Knowedge) and both of them reason about color in a pragmatic manner that
<BR>comes straight out of Aristotle (see esp. Aristotle on color in the
<BR>Metaphysics).
<BR>
<BR>We've not talked at all about Eliot's powers of observation. I don't know if
<BR>other people will agree, but I think they're outstanding. Some of it may have
<BR>come to him naturally, though his training in philosophy almost certainly
<BR>helped.
<BR>
<BR>Pat
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<BR>
<BR>--------
<BR></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial Narrow" LANG="0"><B>Red as a Sensation
<BR>
<BR>[A] "red object" is an object which is otherwise known than by
<BR>the quality red; it is an object which has been given a
<BR>determined place in an order. The sensation is an object which
<BR>has not yet thus been placed. It is incorrect, then, to say that
<BR>we can have sensations of redness; redness is a concept; or to
<BR>say that we have sensations of red. The sensation is of a red
<BR>something, a red spot or area. And the discovery that the cause
<BR>of the sensation is a pathological irritation does not affect the
<BR>objectivity of the sensation in the least. The red "that" was
<BR>there, and the fact that the object can not be further defined
<BR>and verified does not make it any the less object (62).
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR></FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=2 FAMILY="SANSSERIF" FACE="Arial" LANG="0"></B>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
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<BR></B></FONT></HTML>
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